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Abstract
Previous work found evidence that the racial composition of NBA teams
was positively correlated with the racial composition of their metropolitan
market areas during the 1990s. This paper finds continued evidence of this
relationship in the 2000s, with an accompanying attendance boost from
the incorporation of white players on teams located in whiter areas. There
is also evidence that white players receive a salary premium relative to
black players of equal performance quality. An examination of player
performance indicates that demand for foreign players with the skill set of
a forward or center is higher than demand for players of equal quality
from the U.S. However, an analysis of salary discrimination related to
foreign players produced no conclusive evidence.
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I. Introduction
Becker’s concept of racial discrimination by customers argues that people often
increase the cost of a transaction in their mind if it is with a minority that they
discriminate against. His theory also held that a more competitive market decreases
discrimination. His customer-discrimination hypothesis suggests that if firms were able to
specialize in employing minorities and offer a better product or service, such a firm could
bypass discrepancy in wages etc. between equally productive blacks and whites or
females and males (Becker, 1971). When applied to the framework of professional
sports, this concept becomes apparent in fan preference for watching players of their own
race or nationality. The customer-discrimination hypothesis implies that sport franchises
will lose revenue and profits when they follow color-neutral hiring practices.
Professional basketball players in the National Basketball Association (NBA) are
exposed to a level of attention and recognition that far exceeds that of the average
workforce laborer. As a business that offers its customers a particularly high degree of
visibility of its employees, professional basketball provides an ideal labor market in
which to apply the customer-discrimination hypothesis. Prior research is consistent with
the customer-discrimination hypothesis based on a variety of factors that test for
discrimination in the NBA’s labor market. In particular, a number of studies find the
racial composition of NBA teams to be positively correlated with the racial composition
of their metropolitan markets in both the 1980s (Bodvarson & Partridge, 2001; Brown,
Spiro, & Keenan, 1991; Burdekin & Idson, 1991; Hoang & Rascher, 1999, Koch &
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Vanderhill, 1988.) and the 1990s (Burdekin, Hossfeld & Smith, 2005). However, the
number of white players has fallen significantly since the 1980s and continues to do so,
raising the possibility that professional basketball teams have become indifferent to race
in their hiring practices over the years. Given the high level of visibility of players and
team hiring practices in the NBA, a reexamination of this trend in the new millennium
could provide valuable insights into the pertinence of customer discrimination in today’s
economy.
After identifying the relationship between team racial composition and that of
their market area for fans, the next step is to address the question of whether teams have
maximized their attendance and revenues by effectively ‘matching’ the racial profile of
their team to that of the market. While the majority of the conclusions of prior research
on this topic are mixed, Burdekin, Hossfeld & Smith (2005) found that significant
revenue gains accompanied the inclusion of white players on teams located in “whiter”
areas during the 1990s. At the same time, they found that the revenue product of a white
player increased on the margin as the number of white players in the league declined
significantly. They also identify a tendency for top-performing White players to locate in
cities with larger White populations. Using more recent data, this study will examine
whether these three developments have carried over into the 2000s.
Recently, a new demographic phenomenon has arisen in the NBA as talent has
flooded the league from overseas. At the start of the 2009-10 season, 83 international
players from 36 countries and territories were on team’s official rosters matching the
2006-07 season’s record high (NBA.com). This trend will certainly have implications for
the customer-discrimination hypothesis as it applies to the NBA because fans are
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increasingly exposed to talent from around the world. Assuming that NBA teams
compete for fans in their quest to increase profits and maximize owner utility, this study
will apply similar tests to those used in Burdekin, Hossfeld & Smith’s 2005 work to
determine if customer discrimination exists for nationality characteristics. Previous work
suggests that nationality characteristics will have a significant impact on team
performance, after controlling for salary expenditure, only if a discriminatory wage
structure exists. Pedace (2008) examined performance and wage data from 1997 to 2007
in the English Premier League using a similar market test approach. Pedace finds
evidence that players from South America received slightly preferential labor market
treatment and that team owners observed increased attendance with a larger presence of
South American players. However, aside from this minor bias towards South American
players, Pedace finds limited evidence of discrimination against nationality. This study
will apply a similar analysis to the NBA to establish whether a comparable trend exists in
the professional basketball market.

II. Review of Existing Literature
Gary S. Becker was one of the first economists to focus on the existence of
discrimination in the market place. While discrimination was previously considered a
topic within the domain of sociologists and psychologists, Beck’s groundbreaking 1971
work, titled The Economics of Discrimination, examined the topic under the discerning
eye of economic analysis, defining economic discrimination as the difference in (or ratio
of) average wage rates of minority and majority workers who may be reasonably
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assumed to have equal productive capacities. This concept of economic discrimination
has theoretical as well as practical importance because it challenges a fundamental
principle of the workings of competitive economies: that equally productive workers
should receive equal wages. In the same work, Becker identifies three distinct sources of
discrimination: employer prejudice, coworker preferences, and customer preferences. The
first two sources, employer prejudice and coworker preferences, should largely be
eliminated by a market with competitive, profit-maximizing characteristics or result in
the segregation of workers between discriminating and non-discriminating employers
(Becker, 1971). Within the highly competitive labor market for professional athletes, this
would imply that discrimination by employers and by fellow workers should disappear in
the long-run. Discrimination by customers, on the other hand, may not be eliminated by
market forces, even in the long run (Nardinelli & Simon, 1990). Although it is difficult to
distinguish between customer discrimination and the other market factors that affect
wages and firms’ hiring procedures, there is existing evidence that customer
discrimination is still quite prevalent. In particular, Holzer and Ihlanfeldt (1998),
examining evidence from four major metropolitan areas, find that customer
discrimination remains a common occurrence, and is especially evident when employees
have significant contact with their customers.
Evidence from professional sports seems to be consistent with Becker’s customerdiscrimination hypothesis. In particular, an abundance of literature exists comparing the
racial profile of teams in professional basketball to that of their corresponding markets
areas. Using data from the 1980s, a number of studies found that NBA teams situated in a
market with a White-dominated demographic had a significantly larger share of White
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players (Bodvarson & Partridge, 2001; Brown, Spiro, & Keenan, 1991; Burdekin &
Idson, 1991; Hoang & Rascher, 1999, Koch & Vanderhill, 1988.) A number of earlier
studies exhibit the same results with data from the 1970s. Burdekin, Hossfeld and Smith
(2005), suggest that “the decline in the number of white players in the NBA since the
1980s raises the possibility that basketball teams have become more ‘color-blind’ in their
hiring practices throughout the years.” However, the results from their work confirm a
continued evidence of this relationship in the 1990s, matching the demographic
composition of a team to that of its market area (Burdekin, Hossfeld and Smith , 2005).
After attempting to re-examine the relationship between teams’ demographic
profiles and their corresponding market areas, it follows logically to address the question
of whether teams see an accompanying attendance and revenue gain from a “match”
between the races of their players to that of their market. Prior research on the topic has
produced mixed results, although studies of the NBA have had the most success with this
subject. Kahn and Sherer (1988), Burdekin and Idson (1991), Hoang and Rascher (1999),
using data from the NBA during the 1980s, all found that a positive match between team
racial composition and the racial composition of the team’s SMSA area increases
attendance significantly. However, two other studies, utilizing similar datasets from the
NBA, found no statistical relationship between racial composition matching and team
attendance (Dey, 1997; McCormick & Tollison, 2001). A re-examination of this effect by
Burdekin, Hossfeld and Smith (2005) found significant attendance and revenue gains
accompanying the inclusion of white players on teams that were located in whiter areas
during the 1990s. Evidence from professional baseball, although sparse, has seen similar
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results, suggesting that fans maintain racial preferences for players in the MLB.
(Anderson & La Croix, 1991; Fort & Gill, 2000; Nardinelli & Simon, 1990).
Another common tool for identifying and measuring discrimination is the use of
earnings equations estimates to examine disparities between minority and majority group
wages. Using individual player salary as the dependent variable and controlling for player
performance and regional market characteristics, this method has been utilized
extensively in studies concerned with professional baseball and basketball, where there is
a wealth of publically available, individual and team performance statistics. There exists
little evidence of salary discrimination in baseball, but the results for basketball have
been much more substantial. Earlier literature, controlling for player productivity and
market characteristics, suggests that White players in the NBA received a salary premium
of more than 10 % during the 1980s (Brown, Spiro & Keenan, 1991; Kahn & Sheer,
1988; Koch & Vander Hill, 1988; Wallace, 1988). Contemporary evidence shows mixed
results. Bodvarsson & Bradstow (1999) suggest that earnings discrimination was no
longer evident in the NBA during the 1990s. However, Bodvarsson & Partridge (2001),
one of only a few studies to consider how the fan base in a metro area may affect salaries
for different racial groups, found that Black players in two seasons (1985-1986 and 19901991) were paid more in areas where the Black population was higher, a finding
consistent with the customer-discrimination hypothesis.
In contrast to the large amount of literature available on racial
discrimination, nationality discrimination in professional sports has not seen the same
amount of attention from academics. The most significant research on the topic focuses
on professional soccer, which maintains a highly international labor market with
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relatively few barriers restricting player movement between countries. Szymanski (2000)
was one of the first to utilize a market test approach to examine discrimination at any
level in professional soccer, performing an analysis of England’s most-competitive
professional soccer league, the English Premier League (EPL). Szymanski’s market test
is based on the idea that wages will tend to reflect marginal productivities in a highly
competitive labor market where workers characteristics are highly visible. When applied
to a top-level professional sports league, this concept suggests that team success should
be largely determined by salary expenditure. Holding salary expenditure constant, the
existence of a positive relationship between having players of a specific characteristic and
team success would imply a certain degree of salary discrimination against players
exhibiting that characteristic. Essentially, a team could pay a player from the
discriminated group less than a player of a different race or nationality and maintain the
same level of team success. Using panel data from the EPL from 1978 to 1993,
Szymanski found that 90% of the variation in team success can be explained by variation
in salary expenditures. However, when holding wages constant, he found that teams who
hired black players during the seasons between 1986 and 1993 paid 5% less than nondiscriminating teams to maintain the same level of team success. Applying a similar
market test approach across the top five European soccer leagues, Wilson and Ying
(2003) suggest that a shortage of non-domestic talent, particularly of players from South
America and eastern European countries, existed during the seasons between 1997 and
2000, indicating that teams would perform better if they hired more players from these
regions. However, without incorporating any salary data into their regressions, Wilson
and Ying’s work suffered from the inability to distinguish between a team exhibiting
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discriminatory hiring practices and a team simply hiring the best foreign talent. Pedace
(2008) corrects for this discrepancy, incorporating an individual wage measure in a
similar market test on nationality discrimination. Using data from the EPL from 1997 to
2002, Pedace reveals a similar shortage of players who are originally from South
America. These players are paid a slight salary premium and, as a result, the increased
presence of these players reduces overall team performance. Pedace suggests that while
this event should not occur in efficient market equilibrium, it can be explained as a
natural reaction on the part of team owners who observe increased attendance numbers
from the presence of more South American players. However, while there is evidence of
a slight bias towards South American players, Pedace finds limited evidence of
nationality discrimination overall. This particular discrimination effect is surprising as the
discrimination favors foreign players rather than domestic talent. Pedace offers the point
that this may be the result of increased broadcast revenues that Premier League teams
capture by televising matches in their foreign players’ countries of origin. However,
without readily available broadcast revenue data, this effect is difficult to quantify.
Although the NBA’s labor market is nowhere near as saturated with foreign talent
as that of the EPL, the recent influx of foreign talent into the league offers an ideal setting
to apply a market test similar to Pedace’s (2008) EPL study. His study raises a number of
questions about the factors that could contribute to nationality discrimination in the NBA.
For example, do foreign players such as China’s Yi Jianlian, an average player based on
his performance statistics, receive a salary premium relative to domestic players, or viceversa? In the past, domestic prospects that have been successful in the American college
or high school basketball systems seem to be preferred over foreign players who are often
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considered unproven, high-risk draft picks and unlikely to adapt to the extreme
competition and physical demands of the NBA. This would suggest that foreign players
have been under-valued relative to their domestic peers and that teams could obtain the
same level of success at a lower cost by acquiring foreign talent. However, the quality of
many foreign professional basketball leagues has improved substantially in recent years,
producing higher-quality players with significant professional basketball experience. As a
result, foreign prospects have begun to attract more attention from NBA scouts and have
increasingly infiltrated the more selective rounds of the NBA draft. This trend could be
an indicator that foreign players are now being valued equally or even over-valued
relative to domestic talent. If this is true, can this trend be explained by a player’s ability
to bring in additional ticket or broadcast revenue for the team or are teams simply
responding to better performance? As Pedace points out in his study of the EPL, teams
could capture additional broadcast revenues by televising matches in their foreign
players’ countries of origin, giving them a greater incentive to include foreign players on
their team. Another issue to investigate is whether foreign players are more likely to sign
with teams that are located in large metropolitan areas where there are more international
and demographically diverse populations. If they are, do teams located in these large
markets effectively boost their attendance and ticket revenues by acquiring more foreign
talent?
Questions like these will be difficult to answer for a number of reasons. One
potential problem is the constraints on the availability of financial data for both NBA
franchises and player salaries. The availability of this data is critical to differentiating
between the effect of a player’s performance and that of his nationality/race
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discrimination on his salary. Furthermore, there is the complicated matter of how to
define owner utility. Most of the literature on the subject assumes the profit or revenue
generated by the franchise is the main factor affecting owner utility. However, it is
entirely possible that owners derive satisfaction from other team-related factors such as
winning percentage, team popularity (attendance), or unrelated factors such as the chance
to socialize with celebrities and other popular sports figures. Sloan (1971) was the first to
suggest the concept of a hobbyist owner who derives satisfaction from factors other than
profits and more recent evidence on owner behavior seems to confirm that owners do not
always exhibit profit-maximizing behavior. A perfect example of this hobbyist owner is
the Dallas Mavericks’ owner, Mark Cuban, who spends exorbitant amounts of money on
his franchise but seems to have no other motivation than winning an NBA championship
and rubbing elbows with other famous people (Burdekin, forthcoming). Although this
study will attempt to control for other team factors that could affect owner utility, this
type of owner behavior is nearly impossible to control for and could affect the results
accordingly.

III. Team Racial Composition and Player Performance
Annual data from the NBA seasons that were played during the 2005-2011 period
reveals a substantial decline of white representation in the NBA, dropping from 24% in
the 2005-2006 season to a level that is just below 21% in the 2010-2011 season (see
Figure 1). Across the same time period, white representation of bench players has seen a
similar trend, falling from 24% to just below 22%. Both of these results correspond to a
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decline in the percentage of starters in the league who are white, which fell from 24% to
under 19% during the sample period.
As indicated by Table 1, the distribution of white players and black players is
quite uneven among the thirty NBA franchises. While the Orlando Magic and the Utah
Jazz teams were both over 30% white during from 2005-2011, the New York Knicks and
the Detroit Pistons were about 6% and 5% white, respectively. Data on total minutes
played reflects a similar phenomenon, as the percentage of total minutes played by white
players ranges from 38% for the Toronto Raptors to 5.1% for the Detroit Pistons. The
wide variation in team racial composition is consistent with the hypothesis that fans
prefer to watch players of their own race. However, there are many other factors, such as
the race of available draft picks and free agents or the existing contractual obligations of
teams that could explain the variation in the racial compositions of NBA teams.
Despite the varying levels of white representation on NBA teams, there is little
evidence that inferior white players have replaced black players as a result of fan
preferences for players of the same race. While the presence of white players in the
league has fallen over the years, the performance levels of black players and white
players have remained relatively similar. Table 2 compares the average performance of
black players and white players using individual player statistics from the 2005-2006
season to the 2010-2011 season. The five performance statistics—assists, blocks, field
goal percentage, points scored and total rebounds—have consistently been shown to
affect salary (Berri 2003) and are used to examine starter performance and bench player
performance separately.1 Starters are defined as the top five players on each in team in
minutes played per game, while bench players is made up of the remaining players. The
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analysis indicates significant differences between average white player performance and
black player performance in only four categories and there seems to be no consistent
pattern for blacks to outperform whites, or vice-versa. On average, black starters score
more points than white starters and black bench players outperform white bench players
in assists. However, both white starters and white bench players outperform their black
counterparts in total rebounds. In all other categories white players and black players are
statistically equal.

IV. Team Composition by Foreign Players and Player Performance
Annual data from the same period from 2005-2011 indicates a slight increase in
the representation of foreign players in the NBA, rising from 17.69% in the 2005-2006
season to 18.36% in the 2010-2011 season (see Figures 2 & 3).2 Although the magnitude
of this change seems relatively small, it only reflects a small part of the influx of foreign
players into the league that has occurred in the new millennium. In comparison, consider
that foreign players only constituted about 10% of total NBA players during the 19992000 season. Furthermore, the 2009-2010 season broke the NBA record for the most
foreign player participation in league with a total of 83 foreign players on NBA roster.
Breaking this trend down between foreign players who played college basketball in the
U.S. and foreign players who went straight to the NBA reveals a slight increase in the
representation of both groups. The college group jumps from 5.46% in 2005-2006 to
5.75% in 2010-2011 and the group that went straight to the pros moves from 12.23% to
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12.61%. During the same time period, the level of foreign starters rose from 18.67% to
19.33%, but the percentage of foreign bench players remained relatively constant.
As indicated by Table 3, the distribution of foreign-born players and players born
in the U.S. is quite uneven among the thirty NBA franchises. The San Antonio Spurs,
Sacramento Kings, and the Oklahoma City Thunder teams were all over 30% foreign
during the six NBA seasons from 2005-2011. Over the same period, the Denver Nuggets,
Detroit Pistons, Indiana Pacers, Golden State Warriors, and Portland Trailblazers were all
under 10% foreign. The distributions of foreign players who played college basketball,
as well as those who went straight to the NBA, are equally as varied. San Antonio and
Sacramento’s teams saw more than 20% of their players come from the foreign-pro group
while four teams had less than 5% of their players come from the same group. The
Atlanta Hawks and Oklahoma City had the highest percentage of players from the
foreign-college group with at least 15%, while nine teams had less than 2% of their
players from the same group. Data on total minutes played (Table 4) reflects an even
more varied distribution, as the percentage of a team’s total minutes played by foreign
players ranges from over 40% for San Antonio and Pheonix to less than 5% for Detroit,
New York, Boston, and the Los Angeles Clippers. Differentiating between players who
went straight to the pros and players that played in college reveals a similarly varied
trend. Over 20% of San Antonio and Milwaukee’s total minutes were played by the
foreign-college group, while nine other teams devoted less than 1% of their minutes to
the same group. At the same time, Toronto and San Antonio gave about 30% of their
total playing time to the foreign-pro group while six teams gave the same group less than
3% of their minutes.
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The wide variation in team composition related to foreign players reveals much
about the unique player preferences of NBA teams. There are only a few teams that did
not have at least 10 % of their team comprised of foreign players, indicating a leaguewide increase in demand for foreign players. However, it is clear that a few teams,
namely San Antonio, Sacramento, and Oklahoma City, stand out from the rest in their
preference for foreign players. Despite their large share of foreign players, San Antonio is
the only one of these teams to give its foreign players a large share of the team’s playing
time. Pheonix, Toronto, and Milwaukee, on the other hand, gave their foreign players a
much higher proportion of team minutes despite having a much smaller percentage of
foreign players on their team. This might imply that a team like Sacramento or
Oklahoma City is much more likely to invest in a young, risky foreign prospect and that
teams like Pheonix, Toronto, and Milwaukee are either more confident in their foreign
players abilities or have made better selections when acquiring foreign talent.
Admittedly, there could be many different reasons for the varying distributions of foreign
players in the league. While the preferences of owners, general managers, coaches and
fans would seem to be the most influential factors in a team’s decision whether or not to
acquire a foreign player, other influences such as draft order, free agent availability and
existing contractual obligations could have a significant impact as well.
One possible explanation for the recent increase in the number of foreign players
in the NBA recently is that the foreign players perform better in certain statistical
categories than players born in the U.S. Table 5 compares the average performance of
foreign players with the average performance of U.S. players using individual player
statistics from the 2005-2006 season to the 2010-2011 season. Using the same dataset, it
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also compares the average performance of foreign players who went straight to the NBA
and the average performance of foreign players who played college basketball in the U.S.
The analysis utilizes the same five performance statistics that were used to examine
differences between the performance levels of black players and white players and
differentiates between starter performance and bench player performance as well as
player position. In the first set of results, the differences between the foreign-pro group’s
performance and the foreign-college group’s performance were all statistically equal with
the exception of one category. The t-statistic indicates that foreign players who did not
play college basketball in the U.S. score more points on average than foreign players who
did go to college. However, the result is only significant at the 10% level. The second set
of results indicates significant differences between foreign player performance and U.S.
player performance in eight out of ten categories. On average, U.S. starters score more
points and assist more field goals than foreign starters. U.S. bench players also
outperform foreign bench players in assists. However, both foreign starters and foreign
bench players outperform their counterparts from the U.S. in total rebounds and blocks.
Foreign starters also shoot a better field goal percentage than U.S. starters. In the two
remaining categories, bench player points and field goal percentage, foreign players and
U.S. players are statistically equal. Comparing foreign player performance to U.S. player
performance by position produces much different results. Surprisingly, foreign guards
outperform U.S. guards in every category with varying levels of significance. However,
U.S. forwards and centers outperform foreign forwards and centers in field goal
percentage and U.S. centers also outperform foreign centers in total rebounds. In all other
categories foreign forwards and centers are statistically equal to U.S. players.
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There are a few possible explanations for these differences in performance. First,
76% (367/479) of the foreign players in the league from 2005-2011 were either forwards
or centers compared to 58% (1298/2249) of U.S. players. Because of their size and
defensive responsibilities, forwards and centers generally record more blocks and
rebounds than guards do. Forwards and centers also tend to attempt shots closer to the
basket and generally shoot a higher field goal percentage because of this. Conversely,
guards tend to record more points and assists than forwards and centers because of their
role on offense.3 As foreign players have a higher percentage of forwards and centers in
the data sample, it follows logically that they would outperform U.S. players in blocks,
rebounds and field goal percentage. At the same time, it makes sense that U.S. players
would outperform foreign players in points and assists because 42% of the U.S. players
used in the data sample are guards compared to 24% of foreign players. The comparison
of the two groups by position confirms this, as foreign players only outperform U.S.
players at the guard position and are statistically equal in all but a few categories at the
forward and center positions. One possible implication of these results is that there is
excess demand for foreign forwards and centers and a lack of demand for foreign guards
relative to their abilities. If this is true, teams could take advantage of this market
inefficiency and pay less for higher-quality guards if they are foreign. For the same
reason, they could pay less for a U.S. forward or center and receive an equal, if not better,
level of performance.
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V. Individual Player Salaries - Race
The time period (2005-2011) that this study is based on has not been studied
extensively as of yet and, as a result, no evidence of overall salary discrimination against
race or nationality in the NBA currently exists. The most recent examinations of salary
discrimination in the NBA are from the late 1980s and early 1990s. There is substantial
evidence that white players in the NBA received a salary premium relative to black
players during the 1980s (Brown, Spiro & Keenan, 1991; Kahn & Sheer, 1988; Koch &
Vander Hill, 1988; Wallace, 1988), but the NBA seems to have changed dramatically
since then. Bodvarsson & Bradstow (1999) suggest that earnings discrimination was no
longer prevalent in the NBA during the 1990s. However, Bodvarsson & Partridge (2001),
one of the only studies that considers how the fan base in a metro area may affect salaries
for different racial groups, found evidence in two seasons (1985-1986 and 1990-1991) of
a salary premium for black players in areas where the black population was higher. While
their regressions of player salaries by race found no significant population effect, the
chance that black and white salary levels could vary with the racial composition of their
market area is still consistent with the customer-discrimination hypothesis.
This study uses an earnings analysis similar to that of Bodvarsson & Partridge
(2001) to examine the relationship of race and player salaries in recent seasons. This
involves using data from the five NBA seasons played between 2005 and 2010 in two
separate regressions on the natural log of player salaries, estimating the effects of player
race, team racial composition, and the racial composition of the team’s metro-area. The
regressions incorporate various individual performance and metro-area variables in order
to control for their effects on player salaries:
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EXPERIENCE
FIELD GOAL
PERCENTAGE
MINUTES PER GAME
GAMES PLAYED
POINTS PER GAME
CENTER
FORWARD
TOTAL REBOUNDS
PER GAME
ASSISTS PER GAME
STEALS PER GAME
BLOCKS PER GAME
ATTENDANCE
% MSA WHITE
MSA POPULATION (LN)
MSA PER CAPITA
INCOME (LN)
TEAM WINNING %
TEAM RACE
PLAYER RACE
TIME
(% MSA WHITE) *
(TEAM RACE)

Total seasons played
Field goal percentage (Field goals made / field goals
attempted)
Minutes played per game
Games in which a player recorded playing time
Points scored per game
Dummy for centers (1 = center)
Dummy for forwards (1 = forward)
Total rebounds per game
Assists per game
Steals per game
Blocks per game
Average home game attendance of season
Percent of the metro-area population that is white
Natural log of metro-area population
Natural log of metro-area per capita income
Team winning percentage
Percent of team that is white
Race of player (1=white)
(0-4) 1995=0; 2010=4
Interaction between percent of metro area that is
white and the percent of team that is white

The percentage of metro-area population that is white is used as a proxy for customer
discrimination. While it is not a perfect measure, the racial composition of a team’s
metro-area and its fans should be highly correlated. By controlling for attendance, any
additional impacts of customer discrimination from increased attendance should be
picked up by its coefficient. An interaction term of metro-area racial composition
multiplied by team racial composition is included in the wage regression to account for
customer discrimination’s interaction with team racial mix. If this variable has a positive
relationship with salaries and is statistically significant, it would suggest that customer
discrimination is still prevalent in NBA in the 2000s and has a significant effect on
player’s wages. In addition, a variable for time is included to control for overall changes
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in salaries over time. One would expect the coefficient on time to be positive and
significant, reflecting a general increase in player salaries over time.
Table 6 presents the regression results of two regressions. Column (1) includes all
of the variables mentioned above without team racial composition and its interaction term
with metro-area racial mix. The coefficient on race is statistically significant at the 1%
level using a two-tailed t-test and shows that an equally qualified white player earned
nearly 25% more than the corresponding black player from 2005-2010. [0.247 = exp(
0.221)-1]. The control variables for experience, points per game, games played, forward,
center and blocks per game all have the expected positive signs on their coefficients and
are significant at the 1% level. Time exhibits the expected positive effect and is
significant at the 5% level. Field goal percentage, total rebounds per game, and metroarea population surprisingly have negative coefficients, but field goal percentage is the
only significant variable, and it is at the 10% level. Column (2) shows the results of the
same regression except that team racial composition and its interaction term with metroarea racial mix are included this time. Their inclusion in the regression seems to have
little effect on the magnitude and significance of the coefficients of most of the variables.
The coefficient of race on salary is slightly higher than before and still significant at the
1% level, indicating that an equally qualified white player made 26% more than the
corresponding black player during those five seasons [0.262 = exp( 0.233)-1].
Surprisingly, team race has a negative coefficient, while the estimated effect of the
interaction variable between team racial composition and metro-area composition on
salaries is large and positive. However, neither of these variables’ coefficients is
significant at any level, providing little evidence of customer discrimination or a
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population demographic effect. In addition, both models have a relatively low R-squared
value of 15%, indicating that there are could be other, more significant factors that
explain the variation in player salaries. These could include anything from player draft
position, to the player preferences of owners, managers and coaches, to the quality of a
player’s negotiating agent. Inclusion of some of these variables into a regression on
player salaries could generate a more accurate model and provide an opportunity for
further analysis.

VI. Individual Player Salaries - Foreign
Using the same earnings equation analysis, this study also attempts to determine if
there is a significant difference in player salaries between foreign players and players
born in the U.S. This analysis also uses data from the five NBA seasons played between
2005 and 2010 in four separate regressions on the natural log of player salaries,
separately estimating the effects that a player coming from a foreign country, a foreign
player playing college basketball in the U.S., a foreign player going straight to the NBA,
and a foreign player being white or black has on individual player salaries. The
regressions control for the exact same individual performance and metro-area variables as
the racial discrimination models but include a few additional independent variables:
EXPERIENCE
FIELD GOAL
PERCENTAGE
MINUTES PER GAME
GAMES PLAYED
POINTS PER GAME
CENTER

Total seasons played
Field goal percentage (Field goals made / field goals
attempted)
Minutes played per game
Games in which a player recorded playing time
Points scored per game
Dummy for centers (1 = center)
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FORWARD
TOTAL REBOUNDS
PER GAME
ASSISTS PER GAME
STEALS PER GAME
BLOCKS PER GAME
ATTENDANCE
% MSA WHITE
MSA POPULATION (LN)
MSA PER CAPITA
INCOME (LN)
TEAM WINNING %
PLAYER RACE
TIME
FOREIGN
FOREIGN COLLEGE
FOREIGN PRO
(PLAYER RACE) *
(FOREIGN)

Dummy for forwards (1 = forward)
Total rebounds per game
Assists per game
Steals per game
Blocks per game
Average home game attendance of season
Percent of the metro-area population that is white
Natural log of metro-area population
Natural log of metro-area per capita income
Team winning percentage
Race of player (1=white)
(0-4) 1995=0; 2010=4
Dummy for foreign players (1=foreign)
Dummy for foreign players who played college
basketball in the U.S. (1 = foreign & played in
college)
Dummy for foreign players who went straight to the
NBA (1=foreign and went straight to the pros)
Interaction between race of player and a player
being foreign

The coefficient on the dummy variable for a player being foreign should be negative and
significant if there is indeed salary discrimination against foreign players. Similarly, a
negative coefficient on the dummy variables for foreign college and foreign pro would
indicate salary discrimination against those groups of players as well. These variables are
intentionally run in separate regressions in order to avoid the problem of the dummy
variable trap.4 Finally, an interaction term between race and the foreign player dummy is
run in a fourth regression to determine if the race of a foreign player has any effect on
player salaries. A variable for time is again included in all the regressions to control for
overall changes in salaries over time. One would expect time’s coefficient to be positive
and significant, reflecting a general increase in player salaries over time.
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Table 7 presents the results of the four regressions. Column (1) includes all of the
control variables mentioned above but the foreign dummy is the only test variable. The
coefficient on the foreign dummy is surprisingly positive but it is not statistically
significant at any level. The control variables for experience, points per game, games
played, forward, center, blocks per game, and race all have the expected positive signs on
their coefficients and are significant at the 1% level. Time exhibits the expected positive
effect and is significant at the 5% level. Field goal percentage, total rebounds per game,
and metro-area population surprisingly have negative coefficients, but field goal
percentage is the only significant variable and it is at the 10% level. Column (2) shows
the results of the same regression except that the foreign-college dummy is included
instead of the foreign dummy this time. The substitution of this variable in the regression
has little effect on the magnitude and significance of the coefficients on the control
variables. The coefficient of the foreign-college variable is positive but it is also not
statistically significant at any level. The results portrayed in Column (3) are from the
same regression but with the foreign-pro dummy substituted for the foreign-college
dummy. There is almost no difference between the coefficients and standard errors of the
control variables in Column (2) and (3). The coefficient of the foreign-pro variable is
positive but it is not statistically significant at any level. Column (4) shows the results of
the same regression shown in Column (1) except that the interaction variable between
player race and the foreign dummy is now included. Nearly all of the control variable’s
coefficients have the same magnitude and standard error as the previous regressions with
the exception being a slight increase in the coefficient on player race. The foreign dummy
variable has a coefficient that is large and positive but with a t-stat of 1.36, it is not
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significant at any level. The interaction variable’s coefficient is negative, indicating lower
salaries for players who are both white and foreign. However, this effect is not significant
at any level. While all of the test variables in these regressions have interesting
coefficients, their lack of significance at any level means that cannot confirm or deny the
presence of salary discrimination against foreign players. As each of the four regressions
has an R-squared value of 15%, it seems quite likely that there are a number of other
significant factors that explain the variation in player salaries. Any additional analysis
would benefit immensely from identifying these variables and incorporating them into a
regression on player salaries in order to get more accurate results.

VII.

Determinants of the Racial Composition of NBA Teams

If an NBA team is reacting to customer discrimination in its market area, there
should be a corresponding match between the racial composition of the team and the
racial composition of its respective market. Using MSA-level Census data and NBA
team data from 1995-2010, this study investigates the relationship between team racial
composition and metro-area racial composition. To do so, team racial composition is
measured using three different variables: the percentage of total players on a team who
are white, the percentage of bench players on a team who are white, and the percentage of
starters on a team who are white. If customer discrimination exists, there should be a
positive relationship between these variables and the percentage of the population in team
metro-areas that is white. Two additional control variables are incorporated into the
regression to avoid omitted variable bias. First, the ratio of stadium capacity to total MSA
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population is added to the regressions as an independent variable to account for
differences in market size. Team racial composition should be more important for a team
in a smaller market because these teams have fewer potential customers. Furthermore, a
team with a large population relative to its stadium capacity will probably have a large
number of attending fans who do not discriminate because these fans are more likely to
be marginal demanders of seats than discriminatory fans. The stadium capacity to MSA
population variable should account for this effect in the regression, and as a result, it is
expected to have a positive coefficient. Second, a time-trend variable is included to
control for changes in the racial composition of teams related to time.
Table 8 shows the results from three regressions, each with a different dependent
variable measuring team racial composition. In the first regression, the percentage of
MSA population that is white (POPWHITE) has a significant positive effect on the
percentage of a team’s players that are white (TWHITE) and is significant at the 5%
level. In the second regression, the effect of POPWHITE on the percentage of team
bench players who are white (BWHITE) is shown to be positive and even larger than the
variables effect on TWHITE. In this case, POPWHITE is significant at the 1% level. It is
not significant, however, in the regression on team racial composition of starters
(SWHITE). The stadium capacity to MSA population variable has the predicted positive
coefficient and is significant at the 1% level in the team and bench regressions but not in
the starter regressions. The time variable, on the other hand, is only significant in the
starter regression at the 5% level. These results suggest that customer discrimination
based on race still exists for bench players and for teams as a whole but it has become
irrelevant for starters. The lack of customer discrimination for starters causes the
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magnitude of customer discrimination on the team as a whole to be slightly lower than
that of the bench players but it still exists nonetheless. The disappearance of customer
discrimination for starters implies that fans have become indifferent to the race of starting
players and care more about other attributes such as performance or character.

VIII. Racial Matching and Gains in Attendance and Revenue
The majority of revenue that NBA franchises generate comes from television
contracts and home-game ticket sales. However, the league requires teams to pool their
television revenue together and share it among the other teams and the players. At the
same time, the league allows teams to keep nearly all of the revenue that they make from
home-game ticket sales. While the amount of revenue generated by television contracts
has grown substantially in the last few years, it still has to be divided up among the teams
and the players, making it so a large portion of team revenue still comes from sources
that are specific to a team’s market area.5 If demand for a given team’s tickets is highly
dependent on the team racial profile, then the team manager, assuming he wants to
maximize his team’s profits, will attempt to generate more revenue by taking advantage
of the racial preferences of the local market.
The impact of team racial composition on ticket revenue could have a number of
different implications for the relevance of customer discrimination, according to
Burdekin, Hossfeld and Smith (2005). This study uses a similar cross-sectional analysis
to theirs and as a result, the implications for customer discrimination are the same. Under
the assumption that white players and black player exhibit statistically equal performance
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levels, there are two possible explanations if no relationship exists between team racial
composition and ticket revenue. The first possibility is that fans are indifferent to race
and ticket revenue is not affected by team race. The second possibility is that fans are not
indifferent to race and markets, with the exception of random errors, are in equilibrium
with respect to race. If there is a positive relationship between team racial composition
and revenue, there are two different ways to interpret the results. First, black and white
player performance levels are still equal in quality, but customers are not indifferent to
race and demand more white players as a percentage of team racial composition than
managers are able supply the team with. Second, customers are indifferent to race but
players are distributed in such a way that the average performance quality of white
players is positively correlated with the percentage of the team that is white.
Putting these four possible interpretations into the context of a cross-sectional
analysis on team racial composition allows us to determine the specific effects that
TWHITE and an interaction variable between TWHITE and POPWHITE is expected to
have on team attendance and revenue. If teams engage in window dressing, hiring lower
quality white players simply to give off the appearance that team racial composition
matches that of the market area, and all markets have similar demand for white players,
then the coefficient on TWHITE will be positive. At the same time, the interaction effect
between TWHITE and POPWHITE will be positive only if demand for white players is
higher in markets that have a higher percentage of white people in their population. An
interaction variable between TWHITE and TIME is also included in the analysis to
account for changes in these relationships over time.
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Table 9 presents two different sets of regressions. The first set of regressions
looks at the determinants of home-game revenue while the second set examines the
determinants of home-game attendance. Control variables are included in all of the
regressions for team winning percentage, number of competing major professional sports
franchises (MLB, NFL,and NHL), stadium capacity, MSA average income, and MSA
total population. With the exception of income (a negative coefficient in three out of the
four regressions) and stadium capacity (negative coefficient in one out of four
regressions), all of the control variables have the expected signs on their coefficients.
However, winning percentage the only variable that is significant in all four of the
regressions (1% level). Income, with its surprisingly negative coefficient, is significant in
the regressions on team revenue at the 5% level but is not significant in the regressions on
attendance. Stadium capacity is exactly the opposite, significant at the 1% level in the
regressions on average attendance but not in the regressions on revenue. Population is
significant in three out of the four regressions at both the 5% and 1 % significance levels.
The time trend is positive in the regressions on revenue but negative in the attendance
regressions and it is only significant (10% level) in one out of the four.
Model (1) measures the effect that TWHITE and its interaction with time
(TWHITE*TIME) has on home-game revenue. The coefficient on TWHITE is negative
while the coefficient on the interaction variable with time is positive. However, neither
variable is significant at any level. Despite these variables lack of significance, their
inclusion offers an interesting perspective of how revenue is affected by changes in team
racial composition over time. TWHITE has a negative effect (-0.210) on revenue in the
1995-1996 season, implying that there was an excess supply of white players in relation
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to supply and that white players were of lower average quality than black players.
However, TWHITE had a positive impact on revenue (-0.210 + 4*0.098) in the 20092010 season, suggesting that fan demand for white players exceeds the supply and that
teams with a higher percentage of white players have higher quality white players.
However, as neither of these variables is significant at any level, they can neither verify
nor dismiss these hypotheses.
Model (2) uses different measures of team racial composition, namely an
interaction term between the percentage of white players on a team and the percentage of
people who are white in the total MSA population (TWHITE*POPWHITE). This
variable is expected to pick up the effect that matching team racial composition and
metro-area racial composition has on team revenue. POPWHITE is included as a separate
team but it is also interacted with TWHITE and TIME in a final interaction term to
measure the matching effect on revenue over time. POPWHITE has a positive
coefficient and is significant at the 5% level but the matching term’s coefficient is
surprisingly negative (significant at 10% level). The matching variable’s interaction with
TIME has a positive effect on revenue but it is not significant at any level. These results
suggest that racial matching drives revenue down, an implication that is not consistent
with any of the aforementioned hypotheses for customer discrimination.
The last two regressions are essentially the same as the first two, except that they
use average home-game attendance as the dependent variable. In Model (3), TWHITE
and its interaction with TIME have the same effect as in Model (1) but are not significant
at any level, giving us no insights into the presence of customer discrimination. Model
(4), in contrast to Model (2), has a positive coefficient on the matching interaction
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variable and is significant at the 5% level. POPWHITE and the interaction with the time
trends both have positive coefficients but are not significant at any level. The results of
this final regression suggest that racial matching is still relevant and gives teams a
corresponding attendance boost when they engage in it. Evaluating the results of all four
regressions, the there is no conclusive evidence that customer discrimination has a
significant impact on team revenue but it does have a significant positive effect on
average attendance.

IX. Conclusions
Based on evidence from the 2000s, it is not clear whether fans of the NBA have
become indifferent to race. The representation of white players in the league has fallen
while the results of analysis on player performance imply that teams use the most
qualified players regardless of whether they are black or white. However, this does not
provide sufficient proof to conclude that fans do not care about race. Evidence from
regressions on player salaries indicates that white players are paid a premium relative to
black players of equal performance quality. Teams that are located in whiter areas still
tend to have a higher percentage of white players on the team, particularly on their bench,
and white players are still distributed among the teams in a non-random pattern.
Correcting for other factors, matching team racial composition and team market
composition positively boosts attendance but has no significant effect on revenue.
Evidence from the same period is also mixed on whether fans in the NBA are
indifferent to nationality. The representation of foreign players has grown substantially
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since the 1990s while an examination of player performance indicates higher demand for
foreign players at the forward and center positions and lower demand at the guard
position. There also seems to be a non-random sorting of foreign players among NBA
teams as certain teams tend to acquire and use foreign players more than others.
However, the analysis of player salaries provides no conclusive evidence of salary
discrimination based on a player being born in a foreign country.

Notes
1

Classifying players according to their player position does not alter the overall picture apparent in
Table 2. Results are provided in a separate appendix that is available from Peter Meyer (e-mail:
peter.meyer12@claremontmckenna.edu) upon request.
2
For simplicity’s sake, foreign players are defined as players born in a foreign country, while U.S.
players are defined as players born in the U.S.
3
The primary defensive responsibilities of forwards and centers are to guard the opposing team’s post
players and protect the area immediately around the basket. In contrast, a guard will spend most of his time
on defense further away from the hoop, defending the guards of the opposing team. As a result, forwards
and centers should be more likely to block shots and grab rebounds. On offense, the role of the guard is
generally to be the primary ball-handler, either distributing the ball for other players to score or scoring
himself. In contrast, forwards and centers set screens, fight for offensive rebounds and generally only shoot
if they catch a pass close to the basket. As a result, guards should average more points and assists per game,
while forwards and centers should have a higher field-goal percentage.
4
Running a regression that includes both the foreign-college and foreign-pro dummy variables would
cause perfect multicollinearity because the two variables will always sum to 1. This is called the dummy
variable trap.
5
The NBA’s television contracts for the two seasons from 1988-1990 brought in $12.5 million per year.
In comparison, the NBA’s current eight year contract with ESPN/ABC and TNT runs through the 2015-16
season and is worth about $930 million per year (Source: insidehoops.com and usatoday.com)
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Table 1: Racial Composition of NBA Teams 1996-2011
Percentage of Total Minutes
Percent White
Played By White Players
1995-1996 to 2010- 1995-1996 to 2010-2011
Team
2011 Seasons
Seasons
36.8%
32.9%
Orlando Magic
32.6%
34.0%
Utah Jazz
31.3%
38.0%
Toronto Raptors
30.5%
34.5%
Indiana Pacers
30.5%
22.6%
Portland Trail Blazers
30.3%
26.0%
LA Lakers
27.4%
26.7%
Milwaukee Bucks
27.1%
24.6%
San Antonio Spurs
26.1%
24.6%
Memphis Grizzlies
25.9%
24.7%
Cleveland Cavaliers
25.6%
20.1%
Golden State Warriors
25.6%
22.0%
Phoenix Suns
25.3%
23.9%
Houston Rockets
24.7%
14.5%
New Orleans Hornets
24.7%
20.8%
Minnesota Timberwolves
24.5%
13.1%
Philadelphia Sixers
23.9%
23.6%
Oklahoma City Thunder
22.8%
28.2%
New Jersey Nets
21.1%
22.4%
Chicago Bulls
18.8%
25.7%
Dallas Mavericks
17.9%
15.1%
Denver Nuggets
17.7%
16.2%
LA Clippers
17.4%
25.7%
Sacramento Kings
16.3%
10.4%
Atlanta Hawks
15.3%
9.1%
Washington Wizards
15.2%
14.3%
Charlotte Bobcats
12.9%
13.1%
Miami Heat
11.1%
8.5%
Boston Celtics
6.3%
12.6%
New York Knicks
4.6%
5.1%
Detroit Pistons
22.3%
21.1%
League Average
NOTE: Column 1 shows, by NBA team, the mean percentage of players on the team’s roster who are
white, averaged over six seasons (2005-2006 through 2010-2011). Column 2 shows the percentage of total

34

minutes played by white players for all games played during the same six seasons. Data are from the ESPN
and NBA websites (see www.espn.com and www.nba.com)
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Table 2: Performance Statistics for NBA Starters and Bench Players by Race
Mean Performance Measure
1. Starters
Assists
Blocks
Field-Goal Percentage
Points
Rebounds

Black Players

White Players

0.097
0.019
0.462
0.456
0.165

0.099
0.022
0.469
0.428
0.196

T-Test of Difference of
Means
-0.433
-1.409
-1.137
2.024**
-3.908***

Mean Performance Measure
2. Bench Players
Assists
Blocks
Field-Goal Percentage
Points
Rebounds

Black Players

White Players

0.071
0.020
0.429
0.317
0.165

0.061
0.022
0.432
0.323
0.195

T-Test of Difference of
Means
2.972***
-1.678*
-0.462
-0.990
-4.610***

NOTE: This table shows the mean values of five key performance measures averaged over six seasons
(2005-2006 through 2010-2011) that the player played as a starter or bench player, respectively. A player is
classified as a starter if he is on the team’s roster but it is not one of the five players on the team who
played the most total minutes over the course of the season. Except for field goal percentage, all
performance measures are standardized by total minutes played during the season. Data are from the NBA
Web site (see www.nba.com).
In section 1, total sample size equals 900 (188 starters who are white and 712 starters who are black). In
section 2, total sample size equals 1804 (416 bench players who are white and 1388 who are black).
*Significant at the .01 level, two-tailed test.
**Significant at the .05 level, two-tailed test.
*** Significant at the .10 level, two-tailed test.
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Table 3: Percentage of Foreign-born Players on NBA Teams 19962011
Percent Foreign
Percent Foreign who
who went straight
attended college in
to the NBA
the US
Team
26.32%
8.42%
San Antonio Spurs
23.16%
8.42%
Sacramento Kings
15.12%
15.12%
Oklahoma City Thunder
8.79%
19.78%
Atlanta Hawks
17.24%
9.20%
Washington Wizards
18.48%
6.52%
Dallas Mavericks
19.05%
5.95%
Cleveland Cavaliers
17.39%
3.26%
Utah Jazz
14.44%
5.56%
Miami Heat
16.47%
3.53%
New York Knicks
9.68%
9.68%
LA Lakers
19.10%
0.00%
Orlando Magic
11.76%
7.06%
LA Clippers
15.38%
3.30%
Milwaukee Bucks
8.79%
9.89%
New Jersey Nets
15.22%
3.26%
Toronto Raptors
16.67%
1.11%
Phoenix Suns
11.90%
4.76%
New Orleans Hornets
12.22%
4.44%
Boston Celtics
13.64%
1.14%
Philadelphia Sixers
10.20%
4.08%
Minnesota Timberwolves
4.26%
8.51%
Houston Rockets
2.11%
10.53%
Chicago Bulls
10.84%
0.00%
Charlotte Bobcats
1.14%
9.09%
Memphis Grizzlies
7.06%
0.00%
Denver Nuggets
6.45%
0.00%
Detroit Pistons
5.32%
1.06%
Indiana Pacers
5.10%
1.02%
Golden State Warriors
3.49%
1.16%
Portland Trail Blazers

Total Percent
Foreign
34.74%
31.58%
30.23%
28.57%
26.44%
25.00%
25.00%
20.65%
20.00%
20.00%
19.35%
19.10%
18.82%
18.68%
18.68%
18.48%
17.78%
16.67%
16.67%
14.77%
14.29%
12.77%
12.63%
10.84%
10.23%
7.06%
6.45%
6.38%
6.12%
4.65%

12.2%
5.5%
17.8%
League Average
NOTE: Column 1 shows, by NBA team, the mean percentage of players on the team’s roster who are
foreign-born and went straight to NBA, averaged over six seasons (2005-2006 through 2010-2011).
Column 2 shows the mean percentage of players on the team’s roster who are foreign-born and played
college basketball in the U.S. Column 3 shows the mean percentage of all players on the team’s roster who
are foreign-born. Data are from the ESPN and NBA websites (see www.espn.com and www.nba.com)
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Table 4: Percentage of Minutes played by Foreign-born Players on NBA Teams 1996-2011
Percentage of Total
Percentage of Total
Minutes Played By
Minutes Played By Foreign Percentage of Total
Foreign Players who
Players who attended
Minutes Played By
Team
went straight to the NBA
college in the US
Foreign Players
San Antonio Spurs
28.37%
14.44%
42.81%
Phoenix Suns
18.71%
21.35%
40.07%
Toronto Raptors
31.23%
3.73%
34.96%
Milwaukee Bucks
8.41%
22.04%
30.45%
Utah Jazz
22.38%
3.16%
25.55%
Golden State Warriors
16.12%
8.36%
24.48%
Sacramento Kings
14.67%
9.14%
23.81%
Dallas Mavericks
19.28%
3.55%
22.82%
Chicago Bulls
7.51%
13.60%
21.11%
Cleveland Cavaliers
20.69%
0.00%
20.69%
LA Lakers
17.41%
2.17%
19.59%
Orlando Magic
16.04%
3.16%
19.21%
Memphis Grizzlies
16.20%
1.72%
17.93%
Houston Rockets
17.02%
0.78%
17.80%
Atlanta Hawks
8.29%
8.64%
16.93%
Oklahoma City Thunder
16.19%
0.72%
16.91%
Denver Nuggets
11.04%
5.74%
16.78%
New Jersey Nets
14.38%
2.07%
16.45%
Portland Trail Blazers
12.47%
2.38%
14.84%
Charlotte Bobcats
10.03%
4.57%
14.60%
Washington Wizards
2.09%
9.78%
11.87%
New Orleans Hornets
9.34%
2.17%
11.51%
Philadelphia Sixers
0.79%
9.60%
10.39%
Minnesota Timberwolves
9.37%
0.00%
9.37%
Miami Heat
1.08%
6.75%
7.83%
Indiana Pacers
6.66%
0.00%
6.66%
Detroit Pistons
4.53%
0.00%
4.53%
New York Knicks
2.82%
1.01%
3.83%
Boston Celtics
2.87%
0.93%
3.80%
LA Clippers
0.68%
0.02%
0.70%
League Average
12.2%
5.4%
17.6%
NOTE: Column 1 shows, by NBA team, the percentage of total minutes played by foreign-born players
who went straight to the NBA for all games played six seasons (2005-2006 through 2010-2011). Column 2
shows the percentage of total minutes played by foreign-born players who played college basketball in the
U.S. for all games played during the same six seasons. Column 3 shows the percentage of total minutes
played by all foreign-born players during the same six seasons. Data are from the ESPN and NBA
websites (see www.espn.com and www.nba.com)
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Table 5: Foreign vs. USPerformance Statistics for Starters, Bench Players, and Various Positions
Mean Performance Measure
1. Starters
Foreign Players-Pro Foreign Players-College T-Test of Difference of Means
Assists
Blocks
Field-Goal Percentage
Points
Rebounds
2. Bench Players
Assists
Blocks
Field-Goal Percentage
Points
Rebounds

0.102
0.027
0.489
0.439
0.186
Foreign Players-Pro

0.095
0.030
0.491
0.410
0.212

0.450
-0.599
-0.104
1.831*
-1.436

Foreign Players-College T-Test of Difference of Means

0.052
0.031
0.417
0.309
0.198

0.055
0.029
0.428
0.289
0.197

-0.399
0.417
-0.625
1.437
0.101

Foreign Players-Total

U.S. Players

T-Test of Difference of Means

0.077
0.027
0.477
0.390
0.196

0.103
0.016
0.455
0.460
0.157

-4.893***
6.039***
4.291***
-6.265***
5.643***

Foreign Players-Total

U.S. Players

T-Test of Difference of Means

0.056
0.029
0.432
0.316
0.196

0.069
0.019
0.425
0.313
0.164

-3.529***
5.136***
0.750
0.420
4.995***

Foreign Players-Total

U.S. Players

T-Test of Difference of Means

Assists
0.131
Blocks
0.009
Field-Goal Percentage
0.439
Points
0.407
Rebounds
0.107
N
112
6. Forwards
Foreign Players-Total

0.116
0.007
0.410
0.377
0.099
951
U.S. Players

1.772*
1.877*
3.301***
2.077**
2.131**
T-Test of Difference of Means

0.063
0.023
0.425
0.369
0.188

0.058
0.021
0.452
0.382
0.197

1.356
0.942
-2.459**
-0.851
-1.221

Foreign Players-Total

U.S. Players

T-Test of Difference of Means

0.044
0.039
0.468
0.333
0.239

0.040
0.042
0.493
0.333
0.261

1.502
-1.239
-2.464***
0.006
-3.068***

3. Starters
Assists
Blocks
Field-Goal Percentage
Points
Rebounds
4. Bench Players
Assists
Blocks
Field-Goal Percentage
Points
Rebounds
5. Guards

Assists
Blocks
Field-Goal Percentage
Points
Rebounds
7. Centers
Assists
Blocks
Field-Goal Percentage
Points
Rebounds

NOTE: This table shows the mean values of five key performance measures averaged over six seasons
(2005-2006 through 2010-2011) that the player played as a starter or bench player, respectively. A player is
classified as a starter if he is on the team’s roster but it is not one of the five players on the team who
played the most total minutes over the course of the season. Except for field goal percentage, all
performance measures are standardized by total minutes played during the season. Data are from the NBA
Web site (see www.nba.com).
*Significant at the .01 level; **Significant at the .05 level; *** Significant at the .10 level, two-tailed test.
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Table 6: Models of Individual Player Salaries with Race Variables

Explanatory Variables
Experience
Field Goal Percentage
Minutes per Game
Points per Game
Games Played
Forward
Center
Total Reb. per Game
Assists per Game
Steals per Game
Blocks per Game
Avg. Attendance
% white of MSA Population
MSA population (ln)
MSA per cap. income (ln)
Winning %
Player Race (1 = white)
Time
Team Race (% White)
(MSA White Pop)*(Team Race)
CONSTANT
Adj. R2
N

Dependent Variable: Natural log of salary
Model (1)
Model (2)
Coefficient
Coefficient (Robust
(Robust Std.
Error)
Std. Error)
0.063*** (0.007)
0.063*** (0.007)
-0.481* (0.285)
-0.482* (0.285)
0.006 (0.008)
0.006 (0.008)
0.026*** (0.009)
0.026*** (0.009)
0.004*** (0.002)
0.004*** (0.002)
0.197*** (0.066)
0.194*** (0.066)
0.345*** (0.091)
0.341*** (0.091)
-0.025 (0.022)
-0.025 (0.022)
0.014 (0.023)
0.015 (0.023)
0.115 (0.100)
0.115 (0.100)
0.216*** (0.076)
0.216*** (0.076)
1.14e-06
2.67e-06 (.000015)
(.000015)
0.294 (0.272)
0.135 (0.660)
-0.006 (0.045)
-0.011 (0.045)
0.201 (0.193)
0.162 (0.200)
0.154 (0.197)
0.154 (0.200)
0.221*** (0.057)
0.233*** (0.059)
0.041** (.018)
0.041** (.018)
-0.779 (1.676)
0.782 (2.428)
11.173 (2.080)
11.865 (2.187)
0.15
0.15
2238
2238

Note: These models show the natural log of individual player salaries as a function of explanatory
variables, including the variables describing the racial composition of the team. The results are based on
2238 observations over five NBA seasons (2005-2010). Individual player salary data is from Draft Express
(see www.draftexpress.com). Individual and Team performance data, including attendance, is from the
ESPN and NBA websites (see www.espn.com and www.nba.com). Income, population and demographic
data for MSAs are from the U.S. Bureau of the Census and for Toronto, Statistics Canada (see
www.statcan.gc.ca) and the Canadian Ministry of Finance (see www.bcstats.gov.bc.ca).
*Significant at the .01 level; **Significant at the .05 level; *** Significant at the .10 level, two-tailed test.
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Table 7: Models of Individual Player Salaries with Foreign Player Variables
Dependent Variable: Natural log of salary
Model (1)
Model (2)
Model (3)

Explanatory Variables
Experience
Field Goal Percentage
Minutes per Game
Points per Game
Games Played
Forward
Center
Total Reb. per Game
Assists per Game
Steals per Game
Blocks per Game
Avg. Attendance
% white of MSA Population
MSA population (ln)
MSA per cap. income (ln)
Winning %
Player Race (1 = white)
Time
Foreign
Foreign College(1=foreign and
played college basketball in U.S.)
Foreign Pro(1=foreign and did not
play college basketball in U.S.)
(Race)*(Foreign)
CONSTANT
Adj. R2
N

Coefficient
(Robust Std. Error)
0.063*** (0.007)
-0.474* (0.285)
0.006 (0.008)
0.026*** (0.009)
0.004*** (0.002)
0.195*** (0.066)
0.339*** (0.091)
-0.025 (0.022)
0.014 (0.023)
0.118 (0.100)
0.213*** (0.076)
2.48e-06 (.000015)
0.299 (0.272)
-0.006 (0.045)
0.205 (0.193)
0.154 (0.197)
0.208*** (0.062)
0.041** (.018)
0.035 (.064)

Coefficient
(Robust Std. Error)
0.063*** (0.007)
-0.475* (0.285)
0.006 (0.008)
0.026*** (0.009)
0.004*** (0.002)
0.197*** (0.066)
0.341*** (0.091)
-0.025 (0.022)
0.014 (0.023)
0.119 (0.100)
0.214*** (0.076)
2.68e-06 (.000015)
0.293 (0.272)
-0.006 (0.045)
0.202 (0.193)
0.152 (0.200)
0.219*** (0.059)
0.041** (.018)

Coefficient
(Robust Std. Error)
0.063*** (0.007)
-0.478* (0.285)
0.006 (0.008)
0.026*** (0.009)
0.004*** (0.002)
0.196*** (0.066)
0.344*** (0.091)
-0.025 (0.022)
0.015 (0.023)
0.115 (0.100)
0.215*** (0.076)
2.60e-06 (.000015)
0.296 (0.272)
-0.006 (0.045)
0.204 (0.193)
0.152 (0.198)
0.219*** (0.063)
0.041** (.018)

Model (4)

Coefficient
(Robust Std. Error)
0.063*** (0.007)
-0.482* (0.285)
0.005 (0.008)
0.027*** (0.009)
0.004*** (0.002)
0.197*** (0.066)
0.338*** (0.091)
-0.024 (0.022)
0.014 (0.023)
0.122(0.100)
0.209*** (0.076)
3.29e-06 (.000015)
0.279 (0.272)
-0.008 (0.045)
0.197 (0.193)
0.139 (0.198)
0.256*** (0.063)
0.041** (.018)
0.117 (0.086)

0.057 (.093)
0.012 (.075)
11.142 (2.078)
0.15
2238

11.179 (2.080)
0.15
2238

11.160(2.079)
0.15
2238

-0.164 (0.126)
11.265 (2.078)
0.15
2238

Note: These models show the natural log of individual player salaries as a function of explanatory
variables, including the variables describing the composition of the team by foreign players. The results are
based on 2238 observations over five NBA seasons (2005-2010). Individual player salary data is from
Draft Express (see www.draftexpress.com). Individual and Team performance data, including attendance,
is from the ESPN and NBA websites (see www.espn.com and www.nba.com). Income, population and
demographic data for MSAs are from the U.S. Bureau of the Census and for Toronto, Statistics Canada (see
www.statcan.gc.ca) and the Canadian Ministry of Finance (see www.bcstats.gov.bc.ca).
*Significant at the .01 level; **Significant at the .05 level; *** Significant at the .10 level, two-tailed test.
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Table 8: Models of Racial Composition of NBA Teams
Percentage of Team Percentage of Bench
White (TWHITE) %
White (BWHITE) %
Explanatory Variables
POPWHITE: Percentage White
of SMSA Population(%)
STADIUMCAP/ POP: Stadium
Capacity/ Metro Population
TIME(0-5)
CONSTANT
Adj. R2

Percentage of Starters
White (SWHITE) %

Coefficient (t statistic) Coefficient (t statistic) Coefficient (t statistic)

0.207** (2.63)

0.284*** (2.81)

0.041 (0.34)

4.687*** (3.30)
-0.004 (-0.98)
0.061 (1.16)
0.11

5.625*** (2.97)
0.0007 (0.14)
0.0014 (0.02)
0.10

2.499 (1.07)
-0.014** (-2.01)
0.194 (2.47)
0.03

Note: The dependent variables in the models are (a) percentage of the team members who are white, (b)
percentage of bench players who are white, and (c) percentage of the starters who are white. The t-tests are
based on robust standard errors. The results are based on 150 observations during five seasons (1995-2010).
Data on teams are from the ESPN and NBA websites (see www.espn.com and www.nba.com). Population
is total MSA population from the U.S. Bureau of the Census and for Toronto, Statistics Canada (see
www.statcan.gc.ca) and the Canadian Ministry of Finance (see www.bcstats.gov.bc.ca).
*Significant at the .01 level; **Significant at the .05 level; *** Significant at the .10 level, two-tailed test.
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Table 9: Team Home-Game Revenues and Home-Game Attendance
Dependent Variable: Home Game Revenues
Model (1)
Model (2)
Explanatory Variables
WINPER: Team winning percentage
COMPETITORS: Number of competing
professional sports franchises in the city
STADIUMCAP: Stadium capacity (ln)
Income (ln)
POP: Total SMSA population (ln)
TIME: Time trend (2006=0)
TWHITE: Percentage of team white
TWHITE*TIME
POPWHITE: Percentage white of SMSA population
TWHITE*POPWHITE
TWHITE*POPWHITE*TIME
CONSTANT
Adj. R2

Coefficient
Coefficient
(Robust Std. Error) (Robust Std. Error)
0.585*** (0.086)

0.540*** (0.086)

0.021* (0.013)
-0.011 (0.137)
-0.268 **(0.108)
0.189 (0.150)
0.008 (0.248)
-0.210 (0.208)
0.098 (0.089)

0.0204 (0.013)
0.107 (0.149)
-0.236** (0.102)
0.321** (0.159)
0.010 (0.226)
1.129 (0.845)

11.302
0.58

0.708** (0.332)
-1.952* (0.112)
0.127 (0.112)
9.129
0.60

Dependent Variable: Average Home Game Attendance
Model (3)
Model (4)

Explanatory Variables
WINPER: Team winning percentage
COMPETITORS: Number of competing
professional sports franchises in the city
STADIUMCAP: Stadium capacity (ln)
Income (ln)
POP: Total SMSA population (ln)
TIME: Time trend (2006=0)
TWHITE: Percentage of team white
TWHITE*TIME
POPWHITE: Percentage white of SMSA population
TWHITE*POPWHITE
TWHITE*POPWHITE*TIME
CONSTANT
Adj. R2

Coefficient
Coefficient
(Robust Std. Error) (Robust Std. Error)
0.448*** (0.055)
0.426*** (0.054)
0.031 (0.006)
0.272*** (0.102)
-0.014 (0.074)
0.346*** (0.104)
-0.015(0.011)
-0.060 (0.102)
0.034 (0.044)

5.89
0.48

0.006 (0.005)
0.362*** (0.101)
.019 (0.073)
0.445*** (0.103)
-0.018* (0.010)
-0.905** (0.417)
0.051 (0.183)
1.177** (0.637)
0.067 (0.058)
4.5
0.56

Note: These models show the natural log of home game revenue ($000), as a function of explanatory
variables, including the variables describing the racial composition of the team. The results are based on
150 observations over five NBA seasons (2005-2010). Team revenue data is based on estimates that were
published by Forbes in 2010 (see www.forbes.com and search for basketball valuations). Other team data,
including attendance, is from the ESPN and NBA websites (see www.espn.com and www.nba.com).
Income, population and demographic data for MSAs are from the U.S. Bureau of the Census and for
Toronto, Statistics Canada (see www.statcan.gc.ca) and the Canadian Ministry of Finance (see
www.bcstats.gov.bc.ca).
*Significant at the .01 level; **Significant at the .05 level; *** Significant at the .10 level, two-tailed test.
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Figure 1: Average Racial Composition of NBA Teams over Time
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Figures 2 & 3: Average Composition of NBA Teams by Foreign Players over Time

